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INTRODUCTION
Climate change tests the limits of human understanding of complexity and
uncertainty. It challenges assumptions about our presumed power of control over this
planet. In an intellectual vacuum, climate change is a fascinatingly intricate and beautiful
puzzle of ever-moving parts, and if nothing were at stake, its contemplation would be the
perfect way to while away a pleasant lifetime, posing idly phrased “what ifs.” As it is, of
course, it is a genuine crisis that demands rigorous cross-disciplinary attention. We draw
on sociology, history, economics, biology, ecology, politics, and countless other
disciplines to try to wrap our heads around the problem’s full magnitude. One important
angle of the endeavor, and the one discussed here, is the policy effort to regulate the
causes of climate change, particularly as made by governmental agencies.
Executive branch bureaucracies, federal, state, and local alike, are the oftmaligned or else simply overlooked agents of a substantial portion of the nation’s climate
change regulations. The role they play is vital. Yet, at a guess, very few bright-eyed
elementary school students have ever proclaimed, “I want to be a bureaucrat when I grow
up.” The connotations of acting by rote, carrying out orders from on high, giving the
little gray cells very little to do behind a gray desk in a gray cubicle are unattractive.
Happily, reality is less grim than this tableau framed in red tape would suggest.
Bureaucrats are “active participants in the policymaking process,” endowed with
substantial administrative discretion 1 and tasked with the important and creative work of
“taking the lofty aspirations of political leaders and translating them into concrete

1

Lindblom, Charles and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Policy-Making Process. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993. Print. 59, 61
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proposals” 2. Policy-making “rests overwhelmingly in the hands of the bureaucracy.” 3 It
is to the individuals working in decision-making agencies that we citizens assign
responsibility for making the necessary, fine-tuned tradeoffs that come with living in a
world with infinite demand on finite resources, for deciding the “level of acceptable
risk” 4 society must face. It is up to them to take potentially vague, ambiguous legislative
language and bring it down to earth, drafting feasible policies and practical programs that
will satisfy intended social goals. The pressure to make policy choices that will
effectively address policy problems and that will be well-received with the public and
other constituents is immense.
Like many citizens, I want to know what these individuals working for relevant
governmental agencies are doing to decide the level of climate change risk that society
will accept. I am personally incentivized, not only out of academic or a citizen’s interest,
but as a budding bureaucrat: I find myself in the position of hoping to one day be a
decision-maker in a governmental agency dealing with climate change regulation. To
this end, the first of two broad intellectual goals of this thesis is to grasp the positive,
descriptive theory on how agency employees might make decisions on complex topics,
particularly climate change regulation. Chapter 1 explores theories of rational, optimal
decision-making. Chapter 2 discusses the crowned king of decision-making
methodologies, the rational ruler of the risk assessment realm, cost-benefit analysis.
Chapter 3 establishes a challenger, the precautionary principle.
2

Peters, B. Guy. American Public Policy: Promise & Performance. 8th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press,
2010. Print. 80
3
Lindblom 1993 59, 57
4
Christoforou, Theofanis. “The Precautionary Principle, Risk Assessment, and the Comparative Role of
Science in the European Community and the US Legal Systems.” Green Giants?: Environmental Policies
of the United States and the European Union. Eds. Norman J. Vig and Michael G. Faure. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004. 17-51. Print. 36
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The second goal of this document has a more forward-looking orientation. In line
with my ambition to one day work in this field, I aim to craft a normative evaluation of
the decision-making methods among which to choose when facing climate change.
Chapter 4 is an analysis of rational decision-making, cost-benefit analysis, the
precautionary principle, and the relationship between all three. It poses and attempts to
answer theoretical questions about the utility of each in the case of regulating causes of
climate change. Chapter 5 presents suggested guiding principles that emerge from this
analysis, as well as as-yet-unanswered guiding questions for decision-makers on climate
change to ask themselves repeatedly and reflectively about their work. Viewed through
one lens, this analysis is essentially personal, intended to comb out intellectual tangles
picked up over the last few years and to prime my career path by beginning to build a
bridge from theory to practice. I hope, however, that the analysis can be usefully read by
others as well. The wider audience in mind includes those individuals (already somewhat
versed in the terminology of public policy analysis) who are willing to reflect on the
theory in order to improve in practice, variously adopting and rejecting normative
theoretical pointers as seen fit. It should also be noted as a final obvious and gratuitous
reminder to the reader that any conclusions reached or principles established are those of
a student who has not herself been in an agency decision-making position.
Recommendations for practice are proffered on the basis of read and learned theory, are
hortatory rather than presumptuously jussive, and are unavoidably under-informed by
personal experience.
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CHAPTER 1: RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
Let us start with a common and pleasing assumption: human beings are rational.
“Virtually all of modern economics and large parts of the rest of social science…
embrace the idea that human action is the result of human choice and that human choice
is intendedly rational.” 5 We suppose that we have knowledge of alternatives,
consequences, consistent values by which we evaluate them, and decision-making rules. 6
We might go so far as to believe that we know “the probability distribution of
consequences conditional on each alternative, and the subjective value of each possible
consequence.” 7 As rational, economic beings, we then select “the alternative with the
highest expected value.” 8
To enable this rational thinking, we employ decision-making models, on the
theory that “the process of making policy plays a significant part in determining the
outcome.” 9 A structured approach is useful for reminding us of “important tasks and
choices that otherwise might slip [our] mind.”10 An approach known as “the stages
model” is the most “conventional process model of policy-making”: it “begins with
agenda setting or problem definition; then proceeds through a series of steps such as
program design, legitimation, budgeting, and evaluation.” 11 A more detailed conception
could be to define the policy problem; assemble evidence relevant to the case; construct
possible policy alternatives; select criteria for judging between these alternatives; project

5

March, James G. “Understanding how decisions happen in organizations.” Organizational Decision
Making. Zur Shapira, ed. United States of America: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 9-32. Print. 10
6
Ibid. 10-11
7
Ibid. 11
8
Ibid. 11
9
Peters 45
10
Bardach, Eugene. A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem
Solving. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009. Print. xvii
11
Peters 46
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outcomes of each alternative; confront the tradeoffs each policy would present; and then
finally decide which policy alternative to adapt. 12 In practice, “the order may be less
linear… than it appears in the model,” but nevertheless, the stages model is a “useful
heuristic device for mapping the route that policies take from being just a good idea to
being a functioning program.” 13
We attempt to go about decision-making in as logical a fashion as possible. The
process of conducting organized policy analysis is “a pragmatic and responsible effort to
facilitate reasonable discourse about a policy future that is inherently uncertain,” a
method of helping define “common ground… by the rules and conventions of rational
discourse.” 14 The conventional model of reasoned decision-making may enable
“analytical procedures to resolve disagreements,” and through a formalized decisionmaking process, stakeholders with opposing views “may discover that at least some
seemingly irreducible values conflicts can be recast as dry-as-dust technical
disagreements.” 15 An open-season, less structured policy-making approach would be less
likely to facilitate this result.
Decision-makers operating in a traditional framework characterized by “economic
and utilitarian values” will “assum[e] that policies are best understood in terms of
improving the economic well-being of those affected by them.” 16 Seen through this
economic lens, the goal of linear policy-making models is to “define optimal policy
outcomes and to design institutional arrangements that may be capable of producing

12

Bardach
Peters 47, 48
14
Bardach 24, xix
15
Ibid. xix
16
Peters 59
13
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those desirable outcomes.” 17 These “optimal” policies envisioned as the logical, natural
end product or output of the linear decision-making models may, however, be decidedly
unachievable in the “real world of politics.” 18 We have traditionally embraced models of
policy-making founded on impossible ideals that do not in reality exist. If we are to
understand how decisions are made in the non-ideal world, we should be aware of the
factors that constrain decision-makers.

Limits on Rational Decision-Making
Modern theorists have pointed out that the assumption that humans are perfectly
rational is merely a wave of an economist’s hand: perfect models behave well, but they
are unlikely to reflect the world accurately. Real-life decision-making “is bounded by
significant individual and organizational constraints on finding and implementing an
optimal solution.”19 We cannot presume “omniscient rationality” in human beings, since
we are faced with “limitations of computational capability, [and] the organization and
utilization” of the mind. 20 The “uncertainty and disagreement” that will arise because of
these limitations “are fundamental facts… that cannot be wished away even by the most
rigorous analysis.” 21 This is especially true in the case of climate change, when
uncertainty pervades not only the policymaking sphere but the scientific as well: the allimportant technical details are hotly contested, and no perfectly certain policy can be
written around irreducibly uncertain scientific evidence.

17

Ibid. 57
Ibid. 57
19
March 1997 11
20
March 1986 146
21
Lindblom 1993 vii
18
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To explain the gap between “the perfect human rationality that is assumed in
classical and neoclassical economic theory and the reality of human behavi[o]r as it is
observed in economic life,” theorists developed the term “bounded rationality.” 22 The
concept originated out of “dissatisfaction with the models that adhere to the ‘perfect
rational man’ paradigm.” 23 Bounded rationality points to “the extreme difficulty of
making fully rational decisions and argue[s] that rationality can best be seen as bounded
by organizational, political, and cultural parameters,” 24 including excessive agency focus
on budget, staking out policy turf, rigid adherence to process above achievement of
socially desirable results, and perceived obligation to special interest groups 25. Add to all
this the limitations intrinsic within humans, and we are at quite a distance from a fully
rational man.
One theorist cautions that unless these “limits are taken very seriously, it is
impossible to appreciate the magnitude of the task facing the political system; and unless
political action is adjusted to take account of the fact that complex problems cannot be
understood fully, policy making will fare much worse than it needs to.” 26 Another adds,
even more forcefully, that we should recognize that “we would reach different
conclusions in our economic analyses if we substituted the concept of bounded rationality
for the concept of global optimization.”27 The expectation of perfect rationality
throughout the decision-making process, particularly for the complex problem of climate

22

Simon, Herbert. With Massimo Egidi, Robin Marris and Riccardo Viale. Economics, Bounded
Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution. Massimo Egidi and Robin Marris, eds. Worcester, Great
Britain: Billing and Sons Ltd., 1992. Print. 3
23
Rubinstein, Ariel. Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998.
Print. 2
24
Peters 54-55
25
Lindblom 1993 64
26
Ibid. 5-6
27
Simon 3

Carr 9 - 41

change regulation, is “impossible and perhaps even unwise” 28. To assume perfect
rationality is to dismiss a richer, more complex, and hence more accurate view of
reality. 29
Classical policymaking models are driven by the desire to create the optimal
policy. But some theorists point out that since our rationality is internally flawed and
externally constrained, fatalistically but realistically we should not expect to optimize.
“Even when extended by a range of devices from written language to… computers, the
mind at its best simply cannot grasp the complexity of social reality,” and even “the very
best professional analysis never rises to infallibility.” 30 Another argues that, instead of
optimizing, decision-makers instead engage in “satisficing,” a term coined as “a shorthand label” for decision-makers’ “develop[ing] decision procedures that are sensible,
given the constraints.” 31 This “adaptiveness falls far short of the ideal of ‘maximizing’
postulated in economic theory. [We] adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; [we] do not, in
general, ‘optimize.’” 32 These adaptive strategies,
[o]n superficial examination,… are often dismissed as irrational. For they are
seen as indecisiveness, patching up, timidity, triviality, narrowness of view,
inconclusiveness, caution, and procrastination. But we have seen them to be
useful devices for structuring man’s analytic capacities. Man has had to be
devilishly inventive to cope with the staggering difficulties he faces. His
analytical methods cannot be restricted to tidy scholastic procedures. The…
satisficer may not look like [a] heroic figure. He is nevertheless a shrewd,
28

Peters 54
Ibid. 60, 57
30
Lindblom 1993 5, 17
31
March 1986 146
32
Simon 39
29
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resourceful problem-solver who is wrestling bravely with a universe that he is
wise enough to know is too big for him. 33
Two of the analytical methodologies we have developed to try to grasp our
complex scientific and social surroundings are presented in the following two chapters.
Each evinces an endorsement, to a greater or lesser extent, of either the perfectly rational
man paradigm or the concept of bounded rationality, and the choice between them has
implications for the decision-making process and ultimately the nature of the policies and
programs developed. With that in mind, we turn now to cost-benefit analysis.

33

Lindblom 1968 27
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CHAPTER 2: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Apart from “intuition and experience,” cost-benefit analysis can be considered the
“most commonly employed” decision-making tool. 34 A decision-maker using costbenefit analysis, as the name implies, “reduce[s] all the costs and benefits of [a] proposed
government program[] to a quantitative, economic dimension and then compare[s]
available alternative policies using that standard.” 35 In simplest terms, if a decisionmaker calculates that the benefits of the project outweigh the costs, then he will decide
the project is a good idea, and will take action to implement it. For public projects,
governmental agency employees weigh social costs and benefits, seeking a program that
will “produce a benefit for society greater than its cost.” 36 This goal rests on “utilitarian,
economic logic,” presuming that “total wealth is… of paramount importance” and that
“the best policies are those that create the greatest net benefit for society.” 37 To perform
cost-benefit analysis, a decision-maker must “enumerate, and attach a monetary value
to,” both positive and negative features of a policy alternative, using money as a “single
measuring rod” to allow comparisons of discrete features. 38 We can, in a sense, compare
apples to oranges if we first “convert” apples into these abstract units of “dollars,” and do
the same for oranges. We also take the term “cost-benefit analysis,” in the strictest sense
and as a starting point, to imply “the commensurability of all goods” 39: we presuppose
that the cost-benefit analysis methodology has the power to measure and value all
intangibles.
34

Peters 443
Ibid. 87
36
Ibid. 443
37
Ibid. 443, 444
38
Ibid. 444
39
Sunstein, Cass. Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment. Cambridge, United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2002. Print. 123-124
35
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Advantages of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Policymakers are entrusted with public well-being and granted a slim margin of
error. Their decisions must be “right,” ideally without fail, and are not only high-stakes,
but complex, requiring consideration of a near infinite number of factors. Cost-benefit
analysis is seen by many decision-makers as a tool to “overcome cognitive limitations”
inherent in humans: often there are too many factors to consider at once without carefully
assessing them. 40 Cost-benefit analysis is meant to generate “a full… sense of what is at
stake,” making possible “sensible priority-setting.” 41 To its proponents, it is “a helpful
input into the decision,” and “a pragmatic tool to guide analysis and to allow informed
comparisons.” 42 In other words, it is intended to be a highly rational approach to
comprehensively consider all factors relevant to the decision. It can be seen as an
essential corrective to the pitfalls of human fallibility: we need a structured, rational
approach to compensate for our individual capacity failings. Whereas intuitive, “ordinary
thinking goes wrong” and is “unreliable,” cost-benefit analysis is “a means of
overcoming predictable problems in individual and social cognition” by “putting ‘on
screen’ important social facts that might otherwise escape private and public attention.” 43
For a dizzyingly complex policy problem like climate change, employing a tool that
attempts to systematically account for all potential benefits and costs in due course
sounds hugely helpful.
Cost-benefit analysis has the added plus of generating numbers, which can have
palliative effect on agitated stakeholders, giving the impression of inarguable bottom-line

40

Ibid. 107
Ibid. 107
42
Ibid. 292, 111
43
Ibid. 29
41
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certainty. If the numbers show that costs outweigh benefits, then they effectively
mandate the abortion of the policy or program. Apolitical numbers that seemingly write
their own policy implementation plans automatically are a decision-maker’s dream
answer to critiques that there is “a high level of arbitrariness in modern regulation,” 44 and
the appearance of neutrality and inevitability is unquestionably politically advantageous
in contentious policy debates.

Complications of Cost-Benefit Analysis
The reader may have noticed a pattern in the above descriptions of cost-benefit
analysis, namely that the impregnability of the method’s conclusions is repeatedly
qualified. Numbers do not give certainty—they give the illusion of certainty. Costs and
benefits are not self-evident—they are seemingly so. Results are not neutral—they are
apparently apolitical. Cost-benefit analysis, as with any other tool employed by human
hand or human mind, is not devoid of human judgment. Therefore it is not devoid of
human fallibility and error. Critics of cost-benefit analysis point out that “values are in
action throughout the policy process,” 45 and that cost-benefit analysis is no exception.
During the valuation and monetization process, decision-makers must “adopt a number of
assumptions and approximations to reach a decision…. [T]hat answer should not remain
unquestioned.” 46 Cost-benefit analysis has been notoriously called “nonsense on stilts,”
“impl[ying] that there are so many assumptions involved in the calculations, and so many
imponderables about the future effect of projects, that cost-benefit analysis is the

44

Sunstein, Cass. Worst-Case Scenarios. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Print. 205
45
Peters 459
46
Ibid. 455
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functional equivalent of witchcraft in the public sector.” 47 In performing formal costbenefit analysis, “regulators must make difficult and often speculative judgments about
the likely effects of alternative regulatory strategies”; they add another layer of
assumption when they “turn those effects into monetary equivalents.” 48 If we follow the
perfectly rational man paradigm, then this is unproblematic—we can believe that each
calculation is rational. If, however, we doubt the limitless extent of human rationality,
then each holds the potential for dangerous missteps.
A decision-maker may assert that he has enumerated “all costs and benefits,” but
“all” to him may not be “all” to another. Decision-makers have individual opinions about
what factors deserve to be valued, what constitutes a cost and a benefit, and finally the
magnitude, translated approximately into dollars, of the cost or benefit. Market forces,
usually relied upon to correctly assign value to tangibles and intangibles, “may not
reflect… costs and benefits fully,” leaving some externalized. 49 If cost-benefit analysis
“is used naïvely and uncritically” by a decision-maker who “let[s] the method make
decisions for them,” then “the result can be decisions that many people would deem
socially undesirable.” 50 Cost-benefit analysis is based on the principle of the utilitarian
maximization of social wealth. Utilitarian norms are “important bases for evaluating a
program, but they may not be the only relevant criteria.” 51 But it would be “controversial
and implausible” indeed to assert that “all regulatory decisions should be made by
aggregating private willingness to pay, as if economic efficiency is or should be the goal

47

Ibid. 457
Sunstein 2007 199-200
49
Peters 448
50
Ibid. 456
51
Peters 473
48
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of all regulation.” 52 While cost-benefit analysis provides valuable information about a
policy’s economic desirability, it is silent on other vital dimensions, including the
distribution of those costs and benefits, justice, and ethics, all at play in the case of
climate change. Cost-benefit analysis does not provide guidance towards an answer
when decision-makers ask to whom the benefits of a policy will accrue, who will bear the
costs, and whether or not this is a morally acceptable outcome for society.
The definitional bounds of the term “cost-benefit analysis” are unclear and may
be drawn narrowly to mean exclusively quantitative analysis, or may stretch to include
qualitative description as well. It is difficult to imagine that any decision-makers employ
cost-benefit analysis in its purest, most simply utilitarian form. More open-eyed
practitioners will recognize that “dollar numbers cannot substitute for a fuller inquiry,”
and that quantitative results should not stand alone, but “should supplement rather than
displace qualitative description of relevant effects.” 53 Some go so far as to recommend
that these qualitative effects should be considered a strong enough basis for an agency “to
make adjustments in the analysis.” 54 There is reason to believe that exclusively
quantitative analysis of costs and benefits is incomplete, unreliable, and socially
undesirable.

52

Sunstein 2002 29
Sunstein 2002 123, 111
54
Ibid. 111
53
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Taking a Step Towards Precaution
Time now for a hypothetical question: What is the monetized value of the human
race? 55 Luckily, this is a hypothetical question (although some have taken it as a
challenge have determined an answer) 56. But just for a moment, imagine it is not. If a
decision-maker were forced to reckon up, in US dollars, the value of the human race, or
even the value of planet Earth, how might he go about it? Probably he would have to
make a few assumptions and judgment calls. The point of this extreme example is to
illustrate that we humans have difficulty rationally judging the value of intangibles,
especially in aggregate and on a large scale. Assumptions are unavoidable: they should
not be covered up, but acknowledged and presented openly.
Non-expert evaluations of cost and benefit can be derided by professionals as
misguided and overly reliant on emotional, intuitive responses. But, of course, even
expert “estimates of both costs and benefits often turn out to be wrong,” largely because
the “[overwhelming] informational demand on agencies” is not matched with
correspondingly extensive information. 57 Furthermore, while we may be able to reach
relatively high levels of certainty about some low probability risks, there is a distinction
between this and other forms of uncertainty which are irreducible, 58 inherent within
ecosystems and planetary systems, and that no amount of money or time invested will
make knowable to the last degree. Uncertainty is a defining feature of climate change,
and must be factored into policy decisions about greenhouse gas emissions. In cases such
55

Sunstein 2007 217
Apparently it is $600 trillion. Sunstein, Cass. “Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment.” Ethics Jan.
2005: 351–385. Web. 3 Dec. 2012. <http://www.masonlec.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/C-BAnalysis-and-the-Environment.pdf>.
57
Sunstein 2007 129-130
58
Brown, Donald. “The Precautionary Principle as a Guide to Environmental Impact Analysis: Lessons
Learned from Global Warming.” Tickner 141-156. 154
56
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as these, governments are increasingly “concerned with… risks… and need to be able to
link the probability of their occurring with their relative costs and benefits,” 59 but they
face considerable obstacles in doing so.
Some theorists consider these challenges to be insurmountable, and inadequately
addressed by the cost-benefit analysis methodology. They dispute the commensurability
of intangibles, and argue that a policy founded on valuations of costs and benefits does
not accurately deal with uncertainty. When faced with unknown risk, we ought to err on
the side of precaution. Variations on this stance are collected together under the term the
“precautionary principle.”

59

Peters 456
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CHAPTER 3: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
As with cost-benefit analysis, there are definitional ambiguities concerning the
precautionary principle. One definition states that the principle “references the potential
for harm to persons and the environment, scientific uncertainty about those harms, and
taking anticipatory action.” 60 It is meant to apply “in situations of environmental risk
where by the time unambiguous scientific evidence of a serious problem becomes
available, the danger may already have materialized and perhaps become irreversible.” 61
Proponents of a precautionary approach question the bounds of human cognition and
scientific knowledge, arguing that we should exercise precaution in those cases when we
are at unknown or unknowable but presumably large risk.

Historical Emergence of the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle has more direct historical relevance to environmental
thought than does cost-benefit analysis, a more general public policy tool. The late 1970s
and early 1980s saw increasing “need to prevent environmental degradation, which was
perceived to be growing rapidly.” 62 The “overall scientific uncertainty” surrounding
environmental damage that “could not be clearly attributed to a specific agent or source
of contamination or pollution” meant that these environmental problems “could not be
approached on the basis of the old principle that allowed intervention only in situations of
full scientific knowledge and established causality.” 63 In the US, much of our landmark
environmental legislation reflects this shifted attitude, “requir[ing] that action be taken to
60

Whiteside, Kerry H. Precautionary Politics: Principle and Practice in Confronting Environmental Risk.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006. Print. 150
61
Ibid. viii
62
Christoforou 22
63
Ibid. 21

Carr 19 - 41

anticipate, prevent, or reduce risk where there is scientific uncertainty or a lack of clear
evidence or risk.” 64 The Endangered Species Act (1966), Clean Air Act (1970), the
Clean Water Act (1972), and the chlorofluorocarbon ban (1978) all contain precautionary
language in view of the scientific uncertainty surrounding the regulated substances. 65
Towards the end of this period, a pivotal US Supreme Court decision was handed
down that halted this trend. In view of the considerations listed above, regulatory
agencies typically “regarded risk assessment as a highly judgmental and largely
qualitative exercise,” and “resisted quantification.” 66 The 1980 “Benzene Decision”
(Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute) marked a turning
point, effectively establishing that agencies were legally required to perform quantitative
risk assessment, relying on numbers and valuation and monetization techniques. The
Benzene Decision “provided a huge impetus for quantitative risk assessment” because it
established that the “only language in which agencies could credibly balance regulatory
costs against the health of workers and citizens or the value of ecosystems was the
language of numbers.” 67 Just at the time of rising consciousness about immeasurably
complex environmental problems, then, also came a shift away from the kind of
qualitative assessment that may be best suited to tackling those problems.

64

Ibid. 19
Ibid. 19
66
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New Kinds of Risks, New Methods of Analysis
Some theorists are proponents of a methodology that recalls decision-making
before the legal push towards quantification. Our understanding of environmental
degradation in the last forty years has matured considerably, perhaps in no way more
importantly than in the recognition that we know so little in the face of hugely complex,
global-scale problems. Climate change, the foremost modern environmental crisis, is “so
widespread and associated with such a long timescale” that it inherently “brings with it
enormous uncertainties.” 68 These extreme uncertainties arise “from both limitations in
current scientific tools and the nature of complex systems.” 69 They are new risks that
manifest themselves on a “large scale and develop slowly, often with irreversible
consequences,” and the “magnitude of potential dangers is unprecedentedly large.” 70
It would be comforting in the face of such alarming assertions if we knew our
decision-makers—tasked with “selecting” social risk—were equipped with the best, most
appropriate decision-making tools to confront these new perils. But advocates of
precaution insist that our current tools are inadequate, arguing that “[e]ffects on the scale
of climate change… confound existing approaches of risk management” and that the
“long-term delayed, global dangers… can exceed the ability of current strategies to
contain them.” 71 In theory, this “particular category of new risks” is where the
precautionary principle has the greatest relevance. 72 Cost-benefit analysis is “complex,
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value laden, and contentious,” 73 yet it is frequently assumed to provide neutral, simple,
indisputable answers. Critics of traditional cost-benefit analysis highlight the fact that
attempts to value ecosystem intangibles “require the papering over of many uncertainties
and using so many patently inadequate methods of cost calculation that the results are, at
best, extremely controversial. At worst, they are simply absurd, because many of these
ecological services are irreplaceable.” 74 Rather than trying to hide uncertainty and value
judgments behind a numerical veneer, the precautionary principle proposes a more open
relationship with uncertainty. While it is standard “to demand scientifically verified
evidence of a problem before regulating it,” in cases where “scientific consensus is…
slow in coming, partial, contested, and fallible,” requiring “high levels of scientific proof
before acting is… an irrational strategy” 75 (emphasis in original). Thus the
precautionary principle would permit action before results are completely verifiable.
There are two broad conceptions of how to best incorporate precaution into
decision-making. First, one view holds that “[w]e need the precautionary principle for
special situations in which ordinary assumptions about risk management do not hold.” 76
This language implies a threshold, below which uncertainty is able to be enfolded into
traditional cost-benefit analysis or risk analysis methods, and above which the levels of
uncertainty are extraordinary and require “a supplementary dose of precaution.” 77 The
precautionary principle is not necessarily tailored to apply to “situations where risks are
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relatively well understood”; instead, it is “precisely for cases of serious potential danger
where risks are poorly understood.” 78
As an alternative to the notion of a threshold for precaution, the precautionary
principle could be considered “an omnipresent decision-making screen through which all
goals, potential alternative courses of action, and options for midcourse corrections are
examined.” 79 Seen in this light, precaution “is not simply a process that is or is not
triggered,” 80 but a tool in continual use, across the spectrum of analysis, from
quantitative to qualitative, in cases of certain and uncertain risk. Any decision we make
employing a precautionary approach—including cost-benefit calculations—we make
consciously and respectfully in view of our limitations.

Critiques of the Precautionary Principle
We recur again to definitional vagueness. Just as “cost-benefit analysis” may
expand or contract to include varying amounts of qualitative analysis, the “precautionary
principle” can be interpreted literally or more broadly. One academic draws special
attention to the word “principle” in the term, stating, “It should be clarified that the
United States does not deny that precautionary measures or a precautionary approach
may be adopted to regulate risk. What it is contesting is the existence or emergence of a
precautionary principle that can trump or override provisions in existing agreements” 81
(emphasis in original). Another does not seem to ascribe so specific a meaning to the
term, instead arguing that the precautionary principle, taken to mean a precautionary
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approach, is already integrated into traditional cost-benefit analysis-driven decisionmaking processes: a comprehensive, “competent cost-benefit analysis… takes good
account of the precautionary principle by asking regulators to attend to low-probability
risks of significant harms. [Cost-benefit analysis] subsumes this risk… into the overall
assessment.” 82 Advocates of cost-benefit analysis might insist that insufficiently
precautious decisions are not the result of a fundamentally faulty cost-benefit model:
rather, the analysis can be enhanced by incorporating precaution into calculations. This
statement reflects both a broad conception of the precautionary “principle” and a broad
conception of cost-benefit analysis. Middle-ground theorists seem to support a decisionmaking technique based on both quantitative and qualitative assessment, in which
precautionary thinking influences the valuation of costs and benefits. A decision-maker
placing a monetary value on an intangible benefit of climate change reduction, for
example, could buffer his calculation, accounting cautiously for unknowable risk.
There are also more strident objections to the idea of a precautionary principle.
Some fear it will lead to “massive overregulation of private enterprise.” 83 Others worry
that, “[t]aken literally, the precautionary principle would lead to indefensibly huge
expenditures,” since, if “we take costly steps to address all risks, however improbable
they are, we will quickly impoverish ourselves.” 84 Some paint a caricature of the
precautionary principle as stymieing any action at all: it can be seen as an alarming
mandate that ‘“whatever it is you’re doing, you’ve got to stop,’” 85 or as “literally
paralyzing”:

82

Sunstein 2002 104
Whiteside 42
84
Sunstein 2002 103
85
Whiteside 29
83

Carr 24 - 41

[A] failure to regulate will run afoul of the precautionary principle because
potential risks are involved. But regulation itself will cause potential risks, and
hence run afoul of the precautionary principle too; and the same is true for every
step in between. Hence the precautionary principle… bans every imaginable step,
including inaction itself. 86

Moving Forward: A New Method of Analysis
Precaution is often slandered as being the enemy of scientific inquiry, as founded
on fear and an irrational doubt of the power of science to “know.” Proponents of
precaution do not dispute that scientific evidence “helps avoid… irrational outcomes.” 87
Perhaps they would not go so far as to wholeheartedly endorse a “positivist view of
science,” holding that it is “a powerful and neutral tool capable of predicting risk and
causality,” 88 but nevertheless, far from rejecting the information it provides, precaution
makes “a demand for better science” 89. Rigorous scientific inquiry has a vital role to play
in precautionary decision-making, since precaution “implies research, experimentation,
phased introduction, [and] traceable usage.” 90 Fuller reporting could include “a more
comprehensive quantitative and qualitative (descriptive) analysis and discussion of
uncertainty” that would candidly disclose any unknowns and unknowables in the
scientific process. 91 It could discuss “sources of uncertainty…; the type of uncertainty…;
the degree of uncertainty and certainty in conclusions; how much uncertainty can or
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cannot be reduced through additional research; and the implications of uncertainty.” 92
Thus, a “commitment to precaution” as a decision-making metric could be seen as more
honest, more open than analysis based predominantly on valuations of costs and benefits:
a precautionary approach would not force scientists or decision-makers “to pretend that
they can quantify, make commensurate, and maximize benefits when, in truth, the
conditions for such operations are unavailable” 93. Precaution “has the advantage of
bringing the elements of judgment out into the open and making them subject to debate,
rather than burying them in methodologies understandable only by experts.” 94 This
transparency has the potential to enhance the democratic element of policy-making, but it
may also be opposed by experts who are not eager to have to defend qualitative
assumptions to a public more willing to accept numerically justifiable, quantitative
conclusions.
Interestingly, academic proponents of cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary
principle both make the case that their approach is the more progressive. On one hand,
cost-benefit analysis is a helpful tool because we can use it to make informed, rational
decisions that rise above of cognitive errors. 95 On the other hand, “[t]he emergence of
the precautionary principle is a classic example of social learning in environmental
affairs…. Societies, like individuals, are capable of evolving more sophisticated means
of cognition…. Precaution is a corrective factor built into our societies’ means of
environmental cognition.” 96 Precaution is already embedded in some of America’s most
hallowed environmental laws, as mentioned previously. It is also “a settled matter of
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international law,” specifically under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which “include[s] a version of the precautionary principle as a
mandatory guide to all nations that are parties to the UNFCCC.” 97 The oxymoronic
phrase “mandatory guide” aside, it is remarkable that such language made its way into
the document at all. Its inclusion marks a shift in human perception of our own
capabilities. After at least two centuries marked by both the rhetoric and industrial-scale
evidence of human dominion over the earth, “[f]or the first time, progress consists in
recognizing our inability to master the world” 98.
Institutionalized precaution in political and regulatory structures naturally follows
theoretical discourse: “creating new institutional structures that promote precaution” is an
important step towards making precautionary decision-making habitual. 99 But doing so
has the potential of sapping the method’s strength, since institutionalized precaution
would face disciplinary demands. The pressure “to transform it into easily performable
bureaucratic routines that can survive judicial review and meet citizens’ demands for
objectivity [would] prove irresistible,” and the method might “lose the active engagement
with the uncertain and the unfathomable, and the commitment to moral reflection.” 100
This rather defeatist viewpoint—that precaution must be embedded in decisionmaking institutions if we are to be expected to consistently make acceptable policy
decisions but that the very act of institutionalizing it might defeat the purpose—brings us
to an evaluation of the potentials for operationalization of the two analytical methods of
cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle.
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
The object of this analysis is to synthesize the preceding theory of cost-benefit
analysis and precaution, exploring what differentiates and what connects them, through
considering the role of the decision-maker’s perception of human rationality in analyzing
risk and uncertainty. Running below the surface of this analysis are questions about the
value of these theories to practitioners tackling complex problems like climate change in
real life. Do decision-makers know enough through intuition and experience that they
needn’t rely on theory put forth by academics? Should we concern ourselves with
developing perfectly descriptive models in the theoretical realm, and should we make an
effort to match practice to normative theories? And if so, which ones? In short, do the
theories analyzed here amount to a kind of cohesive manifesto that should be paid any
heed by practitioners? Furthermore, we should consider the utility and relevance of these
normative conclusions in the context of climate change regulation.
For now, I must believe that consideration of the theory—leading either to its
ultimate adoption or dismissal—is valuable. It is worth reiterating here that this
document reflects the transitional stage of its author, versed in academic theory and
poised to enter the real world of the practitioner. From this vantage point, I can only
analyze practice by pointing out theory; I cannot do the reverse and draw on experience
and practice to critique theory. This chapter imagines how future decisions might be
formed. Rhetorical questions that are unanswerable from my current standpoint (or
perhaps from anyone’s) are reserved for the list of guiding questions in Chapter 5. The
experience needed to discern the actual limitations on operationalizing theory is currently
missing, but hopefully yet to come.
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Analysis of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Precaution
I disbelieve that optimal regulations can be achieved simply by following a linear,
quantitative method of integrating the best available scientific evidence and accounting
for costs and benefits. Numbers are valuable insofar as they are the most able to stolidly
rebuff challenges, including legal ones, to their validity. It is true that they facilitate
negotiation, an important advantage in a world with finite resources in which we must
consider tradeoffs carefully. Numbers can add to our store of knowledge, decreasing the
amount of things that remain outside our comprehension. But there will still be a gap in
which uncertainty remains. And even numbers that constitute our knowledge should be
questioned. Quantification of all relevant aspects—of intangible, incommensurable
social costs and benefits—is not inevitable; it is contextually driven. It may resolve some
debates by reducing unknown risks, but after a point, quantification can only serve to
further complicate the debate. Valuation and monetization of extreme intangibles, as we
see so often in the case of climate change, is not always helpful to a regulatory
discussion: factors can be “on screen” and have recognized value without bearing an
explicit price tag. There are some debates that must be argued without numbers, along
metrics that cost-benefit analysis does not and cannot speak to, such as distribution,
justice, and ethics. These are uncomfortably vague terms, of course, but attaching a
number to them will make them only more unwieldy, not any more manageable. Crafting
an appropriate policy is not simply a matter of demanding more research and collecting
more information in the hopes of being able to quantify a greater slice of the uncertainty.
To a point this will serve, but thereafter, the marginal benefit received from the extra
knowledge is not worth the marginal cost of collecting it.
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Decision-makers should carefully consider the role they allow cost-benefit
analysis to play in their decision-making process. They should evaluate how successfully
they believe cost-benefit analysis captures and values complex, intangible costs and
benefits. If not very successfully, then the decision-maker should seek some method of
more comprehensively valuing those features. For some, this may be a method of
modified cost-benefit analysis, a “comprehensive” cost-benefit analysis that incorporates
qualitative as well as strictly quantitative factors into its calculations.
Cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle imply differing mindsets on
rationality and its ability to cope with uncertainty. It may be tempting to conceptualize
cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle as contrasting methodologies;
indeed in their most reductionist, extreme theoretical forms, this may be true. It will be
more useful, however, to think of these two approaches as situated not in opposition, but
towards the ends of a spectrum, a sliding scale of greater to lesser integration of
precaution.

A Spectrum of Precaution
It is important to recognize that cost-benefit analysis is not synonymous with
quantitative analysis; nor is the precautionary principle synonymous with qualitative
analysis. Characteristics of quantitative analysis include: valuation, monetization,
cardinal comparison and ranking, and the assumption of commensurability. Qualitative
analysis is marked by: description, estimation, ordinal comparison and ranking, and the
assumption of incommensurability. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are both
inevitably influenced by human fallibility and subjectivity. While cost-benefit analysis
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may lie closer to the quantitative analysis end of the spectrum and the precautionary
principle closer to the qualitative, there is still a considerable gray area of overlap
between the goals of cost-benefit analysis and of the precautionary principle. The two
extremes are politically untenable. A regulation based on cold numerical analysis alone
would fail to impress citizens who are also concerned with non-utilitarian values such as
morality; a regulation based on nothing more than the decision-makers’ opinions about
what is important with no attempt made at numerical justification would be rejected
because those same citizens also care about the decision’s economic impacts. But
decision-makers are more subtle and can walk this fine line. We can conceive of a kind
of decision-making for regulating risk that merges quantitative and qualitative analysis:
less strict, more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that can also exhibit the
characteristics of qualitative analysis. Comprehensive cost-benefit analysis may
describe, estimate, rank ordinally, and acknowledge the incommensurability of certain
factors. We would expect most decision-making on climate change regulation to lie
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, occurring in an environment of comingling
assessment methodologies, integrating precaution into numerical calculations,
qualitatively accounting for any remaining, incommensurate anticipated costs and
benefits, as well as incommensurate, unanticipated, uncertain risk. The calculation would
be comprehensive and cautious.
What can we call this gray area? Proponents of cost-benefit analysis might insist
that it is still cost-benefit analysis, with precaution sprinkled throughout. Precautionary
supporters might say that the principal mode of decision-making thought is caution, aided
along by quantification. It may even be possible for the same decision-making behavior
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to be called both cost-benefit analysis and the precautionary principle in action by
different theorists in a term turf war.
This spectrum from more or less integration of precaution is matched by—is in
fact generated by—a corresponding sliding scale of faith in human rationality in the
decision-making process.

A Spectrum of Rationality
The active, if tautological, phrase “decision-makers make decisions” is a more
evocative and accurate conceptualization of the process than the passive “decisions are
made.” It serves to indicate that decisions do not make themselves; fallible humans are in
the driver’s seat, making, even with their best ability, only an attempt at objectivity, and
having, even with their best intentions, only aspirations towards complete rationality.
Humans are fallible. Is fully “rational” decision-making possible?
Where along the quantitative-qualitative spectrum of the integration of precaution
decision-makers choose the locus for their own decision-making depends upon where
they situate themselves along the spectrum of faith in human rationality. How we make
decisions relates back to our confidence in ourselves, in our scientific investigative
abilities, and in linear, inclusive, rational thought to enable us to make optimal decisions.
If we believe that we are highly capable of rational decision-making, then we will believe
more strongly that costs and benefits are commensurable, that they can be valued,
monetized, and compared. We will be towards the quantitative end of the spectrum, with
comparatively less integrated precaution. If, on the other hand, we believe that our
rationality is bounded and our decision-making flawed, we will believe more strongly
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that the world around us is incommensurable, that we should not attempt to rank
cardinally, but should instead rely on description and ordinal comparison, doing so in a
cautious way, fully conscious that we are not and cannot be in full possession of the facts,
and that we do not know all we need to know to make a perfectly optimal decision. We
will be towards the qualitative end of the spectrum, with greater integrated precaution.
As optimal a decision as we can make—that is, a satisfactory decision—will be
based on a healthy attitude towards rationality. The case is clear that we should not
expect our rationality to be perfect, much as we would like it to. For anyone to assume
that he is a perfectly rational man would be hubris. If we accept human fallibility, there
are important decision-making implications. The solution is not to abandon all hope of
rationality; clearly the tools we have developed are an aid to rational thought. We can
assume some but not perfect rationality. This translates into a decision-making technique
that integrates a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis, highlighting the
importance of integrating precaution throughout the decision-making process, including
into cost-benefit calculations. Middling faith in human rationality acknowledges the
inability to rationalize perfectly. A conscious awareness that we cannot know the full
consequences of our policy choices is requisite for appropriate decision-making.
Acknowledge uncertainty and the lack of perfect rationality. Be well informed, but be
both cautious about the knowledge acquired and the unknowns that remain. A decisionmaker who airs, to himself and to constituents, the assumptions made in the scientific
process and in the social scientific political process, recognizing and owning up to any
uncertainties, will stand the best chance of achieving a satisfactory policy. The perfectly
rational man paradigm is not useful—it is unattainable, and pulls attention excessively
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towards the quantitative end of the spectrum, away from the middle where decisions may
be more appropriately made. It is in the middle of the spectrums of rationality and of
precaution that we satisfice.
In the case of climate change in particular, the magnitude and intricacy of the
problem would seem to advise that our confidence in our ability to master the complexity
and reduce uncertainty be correspondingly low. Our traditional rational decision-making
models are simply not built to deal with a crisis of this scale. Consequently, decisionmakers should integrate more precaution into both their cost-benefit analysis and in those
regions where cost-benefit analysis cannot extend, relying on qualitative or descriptive
analysis to paint a fuller picture of the policy alternatives and consequences.

Carr 34 - 41

CHAPTER 5: GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND QUESTIONS
The hypothetical question, “What would I do if I were in a position to make these
decisions?” seems less and less hypothetical all the time. The hope is that some day it
will not be hypothetical at all. This leap from academic theory into practice is exciting,
but slightly daunting. What would I in fact do if I were in a position to make these
decisions? Also to the point, what do those currently in the position in fact do when they
make these decisions?
What follows is a guide for “reflective practitioners” 101—those who aspire to be
better decision-makers through consciously reflecting on their thought processes and
actions. The intent is to compile a list of normative suggestions for practitioners to be
better and more effective. It is aimed primarily at an audience of newcomers to the field
(it is at least partially intended as a personal document), but it could perhaps also be read
by long-time practitioners to give them new eyes for looking at familiar situations. It is a
tentative plan of action.
The goal is not to craft a “perfect” model for policy-making: the preceding
discussion of rational decision-making would preclude that. The list is nonetheless
intended to be a useful compilation of principles and questions derived from the theory,
all speaking to how a reflective practitioner can best respond to academic theory,
integrating it in part or in whole into their practice.

101

Thanks to Professor Menefee-Libey for this useful term.

Carr 35 - 41

Guiding Principles
These principles are conclusions distilled from the preceding chapters’ discussion
and evaluation of theory. They are normative conclusions, principles which may be
valuable to a decision-maker in moving forward in cases of uncertainty such as climate
change. The caution included at the outset of this project is well remembered here: the
conclusions reached are proffered suggestions, not dictums, accumulated by a student
who has only theory, not yet experience, to bolster her claims.
•

Numbers facilitate negotiation, but quantification is not inevitable, and in some
cases may be extraneous or even deleterious to functional debates about nonutilitarian values, including justice and ethics.

•

Precaution can be integrated throughout the information-gathering and decisionmaking process, not just after a threshold of uncertainty is reached.

•

An individual decision-maker’s level of faith in human rationality will influence
to what extent they incorporate precaution into their decisions.

•

Decision-makers will make the most socially acceptable decisions when they do
not rely on humans’ “omniscient rationality” and integrate comprehensive
calculations and precaution accordingly.

•

Decision-makers can confer with theorists and academics to debate the potential
for operationalizing normative theory in practice, in order to ground their
decisions—where intuition may desert them or prove inadequate—in sound
policy theory.
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Guiding Questions
What cannot be captured in principles may be left best expressed as questions.
These are thoughts that cannot quite be confidently phrased as guiding principles. The
questions take three forms: some questions are unanswered, the possible subject of future
research and thought, or that may find resolution through situational context and
experience. Some are unanswerable, irreducibly complex, but nonetheless worth asking
repeatedly. A third type includes questions that a practitioner could ask to understand
and situate herself in her agency context. In striving to be a better decision-maker, a
reflective practitioner might ask:
•

What does it mean to be a “better” decision-maker? “Better” with respect to
what?

•

What is the “best” policy? “Best” with respect to what?

•

How do my personal values and agency culture shape my decision-making, and
my determination of what a hypothetical optimal policy is?

•

Does my knowledge of theory consciously influence my decisions?

•

Should I endeavor to make practice match normative theories, and if so, which
ones? Or is that impractical? How practical is the theory, and how much heed
should I pay it? Do I know enough through experience and intuition to not need
to rely on theory put forth by academics who have not had real-world exposure to
the decision-making situations in which practitioners find themselves?

•

Can I develop my intuition into a justifiable metric? If so, how?

•

In what ways is a theoretical understanding inadequate to comprehend decisionmaking in the real world?
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•

To what extent does theory inform decisions made about climate change in the
agency, and to what extent are the decisions made by intuition?

•

What are my moral and ecosystemic worries and worst-case scenarios? Can they
be minimized and avoided? If so, how?

•

How can I use policy to narrow the gulf between the status quo and my imagined
future desired world?

•

How can I build personal and agency capacity to cope with uncertainty as
comprehensively as possible?

•

What are my individual coping strategies? In what ways do I characteristically
cope with uncertainty to make a decision? Are my decisions more or less
precautionary than those of my peers?

•

How would I characterize the decision-making process in the agency? Do I feel
that this decision-making process results in satisfactory decisions? If not, what
procedural and substantive obstacles in the decision-making process exist that
prevent reaching those decisions? Can these obstacles be minimized or removed?
In an ideal world, what would my decision-making process be, and what realworld factors thwart that?

•

Do I consider myself a pragmatist or an idealist? How does this affect how I
respond to uncertainty?

•

How do I feel about the compromises that I have to make in view of the
seriousness and urgency of climate change?

•

Does the process of vetting decisions to the public have the effect of introducing
more precautionary buffers into calculations?
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CONCLUSION
Public policy is not produced by a single, monolithic entity. Ultimately,
individuals facing personal and institutional constraints are responsible for making
complex decisions employing both quantitative and qualitative, and more or less
precautious, methods of analysis in a way consistent with their personal and institutional
faith in the ability of human rationality to conceptualize difficult problems. Regardless of
where on the scale of rationality and the corresponding scale of precaution a decisionmaker may be, those parameters which they use in their assessment are “pivotal and have
important normative implications” for policy creation and implementation. 102
Despite the room for decision-making discretion, even creativity, there is, of
course, reason to be less than thrilled about the prospect of having to make these highstakes policy decisions on climate change. The realm of public policy in general, and
perhaps especially so for climate change regulation, is “‘is a world of settled institutions
designed to allow imperfect people to use flawed procedures to cope with insoluble
problems.’” 103 We could also suppose that “[a] wise policy maker will not even try for
completion.” 104 Nevertheless, the challenge of making the “best” decision is an
irresistible siren song, and the appeal of the pernicious problem of climate change is
magnetic.
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